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PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES, AND TAXES: A COMMENT
ON THE SURVIVAL OF
ORGANIZATIONAL
FORMS
SAUL LEVMORE*
In The Deregulationof Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership,
Professor Larry Ribstein predicts the "Death of Partnership" in two easy
steps. In the first step, Ribstein argues that most investors and agents
prefer both limited liability and the organizational advantages of the corporate invention, but that they nevertheless may choose the partnership
form because the corporate form results in two-tier taxation. The second
step of the analysis points to the development of the "Limited Liability
Company" [LLC], which allows some firms, in some states, to enjoy limited liability without the extra tax cost, or additional level of taxation,
traditionally associated with incorporation. Essentially, the claim is that
firms would prefer to enjoy both one-tier taxation and limited liability.
Ribstein predicts that partnerships will disappear because they offer the
former but not the latter of these attributes. Large, widely held corporations also would overwhelmingly prefer the LLC form, under this view,
but for Congress' barring their migration to one-tier taxation.'
There are a number of reasons to question Ribstein's prediction and
normative posture. In Part I, I offer a few cautionary reminders from
history. In Part II, I discuss the problem and perspective of creditors of
the firm. In Part III, I draw on an earlier work2 that argues that two-tier
taxation may have desirable aspects. Finally, Part IV suggests a different
way of understanding choices as to organizational form. Professor Ribstein implies that choice and flexibility are almost always a good thing; I
*

Class of 1962 Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I am grateful to Hideki Kanda for

ideas and comments.
1. See Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price ofIncorporation, 77
VA. L. REv. 211, 250-51 (1991) (widely traded corporations remain unable to migrate to master
limited partnership form); Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulationof Limited Liability and the Death of
Partnership,70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (1992) (disapproving of this policy while noting that the policy
encourages the death of partnerships).
2. See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 1.
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attempt to demonstrate that the problem is more complicated than it first
appears.
I.
Despite Ribstein's ambitious prediction, the historical record indicates
that partnerships multiplied even when the corporate tax rate was relatively low. During many eras of tax history, even when incorporation
was both a tax bargain (at least for firms that could defer distributions)
and the easiest route to unlimited liability, many investors elected the
partnership form. Ribstein is satisfied to note that because partnerships
were formed before 1909-before the enactment of the first corporate
income tax-they may have unusual origins.3 The larger point, however,
is that in many years since that time, corporations were thought to be tax
advantaged, yet there has never been much of a partnership shortage.
Similarly, it is useful to note that the present two-tier corporate taxation
substantially burdens corporations because the first, or corporate level,
tax rates are higher than individual rates and because the Internal Revenue Code now taxes appreciated assets (when sold or distributed) at both
the corporate and shareholder levels. Nevertheless, firms that might appear to benefit from the tax treatment of partnerships, in particular the
ability to pass losses through and not merely carry them forward with
restrictions, still gravitate toward the corporate form. Examples of enterprises that seem to find the corporate form worthwhile, even though the
partnership form would seem to be tax advantaged, are readily found in
Silicon Valley.4
It is also noteworthy that partnership tax treatment often is more
favorable than the simple aggregate of individual treatments. As partners come and go, they may be able to shift interests among themselves
to defer recognition. 5 Stated simply, it is difficult for the Internal Revenue Code to have provisions that make all investors indifferent between
operating as a proprietorship or as a partnership. When a partner leaves
a partnership, the question is which inside assets should be viewed as sold
to, or sold for the benefit of paying off, this partner. This either requires
rules of thumb, which are generally inexact and thus either too friendly
3. Ribstein, supra note 2, at 420.
4. See Joseph Bankman, The Effect of the Net Operating Loss Rules on Investment in the
Venture Capital Industry (forthcoming paper) (copy on file with author).
5. See William D. Andrews, PartnershipDistributions:Inside Basis Adjustments and Hot As.
sets (forthcoming in Tax Law Review) (copy on file with author).
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or unfriendly, or gives the partnership's tax planner a chance to identify
specific assets, tailored to the tax circumstances associated with the departing partner. A truly neutral rule, on the other hand, might require
partnerships to identify, on an ongoing basis, all the assets they acquire
as belonging to one partner or another. Thus there would be no more or
less flexibility when a partner departs than when a proprietorship is sold.
It goes without saying that this sort of system would involve enormous
administrative costs.
In short, it is probably a mistake to think of one-tier partnership taxation as the ideal against which to measure the corporate tax system. The
details of partnership taxation, and especially its aggregation and disaggregation rules, almost inevitably make it attractive or unattractive to
particular investors (both as compared to corporations and as compared
to individual tax treatments). Any migration to the LLC form--or, for
that matter, any disinclination of firms to become LLCs despite some of
that form's advantages-is at least in part a comment on whether various
types of taxpayers can exploit the applicable pass-through taxation rules.
II.
Imagine that Professor Ribstein's prediction is correct and that partnerships decrease in number while LLCs increase. Imagine further that
this development does not reflect a tax regime in which the LLC (that is,
the partnership) form is simply more attractive than both the corporate
and individual forms. The obvious way to interpret such a development
would be to say that investors willingly accepted the legislature's offering
of limited liability and that noncontractual creditors lost in the bargain.
Ribstein is sufficiently impressed with contractual creditors' ability to
protect themselves (with higher interest rates or personal guarantees that
essentially return the arrangement to one with unlimited liability) and
sufficiently unimpressed with the existing tort system (which generates
most of the creditors who are unable to bargain in advance with the
debtor firm) to welcome this predicted shift to limited liability. Indeed, it
appears that he favors permitting the midstream migration of existing
firms from partnership to LLC form, even though many of these firms'
contractual creditors will be caught by surprise.
My views on the tort system and the transaction costs of changing
contract default rules differ, but in this Comment I wish to focus on another aspect of the problem. LLCs can be understood as the product of
competition for tax revenue among states and of competition among in-
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terest groups within a state. Because partnerships may wish to become
LLCs precisely because such a change of form alters the rules of the
game and transfers wealth from some creditors to the LLC,6 one naturally might wonder how responsive state legislatures are likely to be to
investors in partnerships and to the creditors of these partnerships.
Arguably, state legislatures favor the partners (and offer them limited
liability in midstream) simply because debtor firms are likely to be a potent interest group with the ability to threaten to move to a competing
state. Accordingly, it is possible that states perceive that they must offer
the LLC form or risk losing an important part of their tax base to other
states. In contrast, it is plausible that the disadvantaged creditors are
harder to identify and organize, and somewhat less mobile. This view of
the origin and spread of the LLC form suggests that it is more an unfortunate product of interest-group politics than a frontier-expanding
innovation.
Of course, there are contrary arguments. For instance, existing taxes,
constraints on raising capital, and other regulations and arrangements
themselves could be the products of such interest-group pressures. If so,
the best public policy would allow winning coalitions to form and reform
without any sporadic cries and interventions by academic (or judicial)
referees. There is thus reason to express caution in the face of Professor
Ribstein's enthusiastic welcome of the LLC form. I would prefer to
think about the interest group stories this development represents and to
examine the possibility that some competition among states is better than
others. In other words, Ribstein essentially asserts both that firms
should be able to choose among forms as they like and that limited liability should be freely available, even when unnecessary for the pooling of
capital. In contrast, the prospect of undeterred negligence, increased
creditor transaction costs, inefficient interstate competition, and problematic capture by one interest group leads me to think that Ribstein's
assertions need more support.
6. The wealth transfer would occur either because the creditors are past or potential tort
claimants who cannot bargain with the debtor firm, or because the change increases the risk associated with contracts that have already been bargained. It also should be noted that both Ribstein and
I assume that LLC status conferred in one state in fact would be worth something in a battle against
creditors litigating in another state.

HeinOnline -- 70 Wash. U. L. Q. 492 1992

19921

THE SURVIVAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS

III.
In a recent article, 7 Professor Hideki Kanda and I suggested that the
separate tax on corporations may facilitate organizational efficiency. We
explored the possibility that the separate tax causes differently situated
shareholders to agree on the timing of dispositions of corporate assets.
Without the separate tax, and with pass-through tax treatment, high-taxbracket investors would prefer to defer sales and other recognition events
when low-tax-bracket shareholders might be more eager for the corporation to recognize gain in order to invest elsewhere or to substitute other
assets in place of those just sold. Two-tier taxation, we argued, can be
understood as a means of minimizing agency costs that otherwise would
be expended in organizing disparate investors and instructing their
agents who control disposition decisions. Professor Ribstein argues that,
if we are correct, we have only identified a reason investors and their
agents might choose the corporate form, even when it comes at a tax
cost, and that we have not established a need for mandatory corporate
taxation. Investors who valued this agency-cost-minimizing device could
opt for two-tier taxation, while other investors could prefer single taxation. From Ribstein's perspective, everyone should be entitled to one-tier
taxation and limited liability, while those who wish to do so can pay a tax
price for an agency-cost-reducing device. Although our argument was
primarily a positive argument about a hidden virtue and an explanation
of the separate corporate tax, a few points should be noted regarding the
case for mandatory corporate taxation.
The problem with a completely voluntary system is that firms would
minimize their taxes by moving back and forth between singly and
doubly taxed categories irrespective of agency costs. If the separate corporate tax were relatively low and the second tax were not imposed until
a distribution occurred, many firms would find it worthwhile to volunteer for two-tier taxation and defer distributions long enough to save on
their taxes in comparison to the one-tier tax burden. And if the first tier
were expensive, firms would opt for one-tier tax treatment even if they
preferred the separate corporate tax as a clever equalizer, or agency-costminimizing device. Ideally, the overall costs of two-tier taxation should
be the same as one-tier taxation. Investors (and their firms) could pay
two smaller taxes, instead of a single, equivalent (partnership or proprietorship) tax to equalize attitudes towards asset dispositions. The prob7.

See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 1.
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lem, however, is that there is no controlling or predicting how much time
will pass until investors pay the second tax. If the first tax is too high or
the second tax occurs relatively soon, investors will prefer one-tier taxation; if the first tax and the present value of the second are low, investors
will prefer two-tier taxation. In short, it might be desirable to offer twotier taxation as an option, or even as a low-cost option, to firms with
investors in disparate tax circumstances. It is, however, difficult to design a two-tier tax that is neither so expensive as to discourage those who
could use it nor a windfall for those who have no need for an equalizer.
One way to prevent these windfalls (and inefficient choices as to form
simply for the purpose of gaining tax advantages) is to limit movement
between one- and two-tier tax forms-and this is the justification for
mandatory two-tier taxation. Investors must choose at the outset among
several available forms, and the system then prevents them from freely
moving back and forth for fear that they will be motivated not to reduce
agency costs but rather to reduce their taxes as their distribution plans
change. I do not claim that there exists any necessary link between limited liability and two-tier taxation. I instead suggest that there is both a
positive attribute of separate corporate taxation and a practical problem
with a completely voluntary system regarding one- and two-tier taxation.
Again, an historical analysis makes this point evident. The creation of
millions of partnerships, proprietorships, and corporations under the umbrellas of many tax codes suggests organizational reasons for the choices
made among these forms, despite their tax costs. If Professor Ribstein
means to emphasize that at the margin there must be people driven to the
wrong organizational form because of the tax laws, he is surely correct.
Such logic also applies to tax-driven marriages, retirements, law schools,
churches, and airline seats. To change these tax treatments, however,
runs the equally obvious risk that actors will run the other way-away
from forms that are sometimes efficient in organizational or other terms.
Ribstein's inclination is to assume that regulation, taxation, and tort liability are always suspect. My inclination is to recognize the power of
private ordering and to be impressed by the enormous number of actors
who have gravitated toward tax-disfavored classifications. In any event,
I would eulogize partnerships no sooner than marriages or apartment
buildings or other phenomena that have stood the test of time and that
go through periods of tax favor and disfavor.
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IV.
I turn finally to an underlying assumption in Professor Ribstein's paper: firms and their investors should have free choice, or expanded choice
sets, as to organizational form and the associated legal (and tax) rules. I
have already emphasized that there is something to be said for systems
that lock in choice. Complete flexibility allows midstream strategic behavior because the tax system's ability to see through changes in form
and timing of distributions is necessarily imperfect.
Constraints on midstream choices are familiar. Would most universities allow students to ignore prerequisites and take courses over any
number of years before satisfying published graduation requirements?
The observer who favors such deregulation might argue that employers
will monitor transcripts and the employment market will force students
to an efficient course of study. But this argument seems easily defeated
by the suspicion that agency costs are often reduced (to the students'
benefit) by the establishment of rules and packages that students must
fulfill. Students must generally limit their choices in order to earn the
university's form of approval. It is easy to see that it might be efficient
for students and universities to choose one another up front, so that there
is a market check on the universities, but then to give up a good deal of
flexibility once the relationship is underway. Similarly, it is extremely
unlikely that investors in a firm (and society as a whole) are best off
letting managers choose whatever form they like at whatever times they
please.
In arguing that the partnership form may well survive and that, in any
event, its demise (as well as the destruction of two-tier taxation) may be
no reason for celebration, I have tried to second, and certainly not to
criticize, Professor Ribstein's central message. I understand this message
not to be the prediction of the death of partnership but rather the claim
that the emergence of the Limited Liability Corporation is an interesting
development that we should consider from both positive and normative
perspectives. Ribstein's paper is provocative, and therefore successful in
drawing attention to LLCs. It also sets the stage for debating and observing this relatively new form.
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